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Abstract 
Like many developing nations, Cuba has undergone - and continues to undergo - a 
revolution in the way its society lives, works and accesses mobility. However, unlike other 
developing nations, Cuba is unique in that it has faced enormous pressures for the past forty years 
due to an economic blockade by its erstwhile dominant trading partner, the United States. 
Furthermore, this economic pressure was exacerbated in the early 1990s with the political and 
economic collapse of the Former Soviet Union, and the Eastern European Socialist countries – 
which had replaced the United States as Cuba’s principal trading partners. These events have led 
to a transformation in how goods and people are moved, not least because of a huge reduction in 
the amount of hard currency available to pay for fuel, vehicles and spare parts. This resulted in a 
number of innovative behavioural and technological outcomes. 
Cuba thus provides an enhanced example of how physical, economic and social factors 
influence the development of transport systems. This unusually severe situation contains lessons 
for other countries seeking to develop more sustainable transport systems. In particular, the case 
graphically illustrates the link between economic and transport growth. The paper will outline the 
development of transport practices in Cuba thus far, look at the options available for the future and 
draw conclusions on what other countries can learn from the Cuban experience. 
Background 
The Republic of Cuba consists of two main islands – Cuba and the Isla de la Juventud, and  
4,195 islets and keys, with a total area of 110 860 km2. The main island is the largest in the 
Caribbean, measuring 1250km from west to east and between 31km and 191km north to south. In 
2001 it had a population of 11.2m, of whom 2.2m lived in the capital Havana. Thirteen other cities 
have populations of more than 100,000. In 2001, Cuba’s largest earners were tourism 
(US$1.84bn), sugar (US$551m), and mining industry (US$465m), while tobacco products account 
for nearly another US$263m in exports.  
Cuba was ‘discovered’ by Christopher Columbus in 1492 but was only settled in 1511. It 
remained a colony of Spain until 1898, when it was ceded to the United States. The country was 
granted independence in 1902, but remained very closely linked politically and economically to the 
United States. Indeed, until 1934 the USA reserved the right to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs, 
while by 1958 it still accounted for around 70% of Cuban trade (Europa, 2001; Stanley, 2000). But, 
following the socialist revolution in January 1959 this situation changed, as the Cuban Government 
began a series of land reform measures and expropriated all US business interests, in response to 
                                                          
A Current address: Department. of Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, 
UK. Tel: +44 (0)1509 223408 (Direct), Tel: +44 (0)1509 222884 (Department), Fax: +44(0)1509 223981, Email: 
m.p.enoch@lboro.ac.uk 
 
B Author for all correspondence: Dr James P Warren, Faculty of Technology 
The Open University in the East of England, Cintra House, 12 Hills Road, Cambridge CB2 1PF 
 
Tel 01223 364721  extn. 66195, Fax 01223 355207, Email: j.p.warren@open.ac.uk 
 
ENOCH: EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSPORT PRACTICES IN CUBA 
 
 
2 
what it saw as aggressive measures by the US Government. Such policies led to a marked 
deterioration in relations between the Cuban and United States Governments, and in February 
1961 President Kennedy declared an economic, blockade of Cuba1. This action had a marked 
impact on the economy, and forced the Cuban Government to adopt a system of rationing. It also 
led to Cuba increasingly trading with Eastern European socialist countries and the Soviet Union 
(the COMECON group). Like most Latin American countries, Cuba's economy showed steady 
growth between 1940 and 1980. However, during the 1980s while the total Latin American Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) actually fell by an average of 1.7% per annum, Cuba's Gross Social 
Product (roughly equivalent to GDP but also including state provided services) increased annually 
at an average rate of 6.7% (Segre et al, 1997).  
This impressive economic performance was partially due to Cuba receiving preferential 
treatment from the USSR. It also meant that by 1989 around 85% of Cuban foreign trade was with 
the USSR and Eastern Europe (Diaz-Briquets and Perez-Lopez, 1995). This changed dramatically 
with the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the other 
socialist economies between 1989-1993 (as well as the dissolution of COMECON in 1991), the 
trade agreements were re-written and Cuba was faced with paying the market prices for imports 
with hard currency.  
The consequent economic crisis led the Government to declare a Special Period in Time of 
Peace (or State of Emergency) from September 1990. This involved measures including rationing 
food and clothing; increasing hard currency revenues through foreign investment; restructuring the 
Cuban economy to become more market-based; and lessening oil consumption through rationing 
public utilities, scheduled blackouts, reducing industrial production and cutting the use of motorised 
transport. It also led, in July 1993, to the official adoption of the US dollar as a second parallel 
currency to the Cuban Peso the liberalisation of some working regulations to allow small 
businesses to be established and to a strategy of developing tourism to raise hard currency. 
Despite these measures, per capita GDP fell by 4% in 1990, and further in the following years. The 
GDP trend is shown in Figure 1 (ONE, 1973-2002). By 1996 in became clear (as shown in the 
steady increases of GDP) that the reforms established in 1993 and earlier were working.  
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FIGURE 1: The trend in GDP (percentage change based on previous annum). 
Transport policy and organisation 
The Central Communist Party Congress meets every five years to set out a strategic policy 
framework. At the last Congress in October 1997, the main transport measures were to: 
• Upgrade the main ports used for international trade; 
• Improve urban, suburban, rural and inter city transport (buses and railways); 
• Improve the road network and infrastructure associated with it; 
                                                          
1 This economic blockade was further extended by the so-called Toricelli Law in 1992, and the 
Helms-Burton Law in 1996, which sought to ‘dissuade’ companies and citizens from other countries 
from trading with Cuba. 
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• Link more closely the development of freight transport and with that of the economy; 
• Continue and sustain the use of bicycles, wherever possible. 
In addition, fuel deliveries to both state and private sectors were to be reduced by up to 80%, 
tractor use was partially substituted with animal power (oxen and/or mules), and employment policy 
was altered to encourage people to work closer to their homes. Other measures undertaken 
included energy-rationing, under a scheduled blackout programme, and the part-time closure of 
some nickel processing and oil refining plants due to a lack of imported oil. These had significant 
impacts on the transport sector within Cuba, the most notable being the supply of gasoline and 
diesel for use for peso taxis (i.e. taxis paid for in the Cuban Peso currency). The number of dollar 
taxis, on the other hand, has risen in proportion to tourism, and has helped spur the growth of new 
vehicles on the road network in this mixed enterprise economy.  
The transfer of transport policy into practice is effected by a number of Government 
departments at both the national and provincial levels. This section explains how this is organised 
for the public transport, road, automobile and rail sectors, and briefly looks at how planning is 
conducted. 
Public transport 
Nationally, public transport in Cuba is directed by the Ministerio del Transporte (MITRANS), 
although implementation of policy and the operation of public transport in each of the 14 provinces 
and the Special Municipality Isla de la Juventud, is actually carried out by ‘Provincial Transport 
Directorates’, which are subordinate to the Popular Power Assemblies. For example, in the 
Province of the City of Havana, Provincial Transport Authority functions are carried out by 11 
divisions. These are: 
• Omnibus Metropolitanos (OM) – metropolitan buses 
• MetroBus – “camellos”, converted from truck based (military) tank transporters 
• Autos (also known as Panatrans) – taxi, rental car, and drivers training companies 
• Transporte Escolar – educational transport 
• Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos - (suburban railway) 
• Produccion y Talleres  - production workshops 
• Talleres Automotores – maintenance workshops 
• Servicentros – fuel service stations 
• Proveedora General del Transporte – vehicle parts 
• Construccion y Mantenimiento – building and maintenance (property) 
• Consultoria economica – statistics, planning, finances 
Public transport must be self-financing. Until 1994, general government funds from 
MITRANS (of around $US4m per annum) were used to fund the Provincial Transport Directorate in 
the City of Havana budget. Public transport in Havana has always been able to cover operating 
expenses, that are paid in Cuban Pesos through the fares. But there has been a constant problem 
with financing fuel, new vehicles and spare parts and other supplies which require hard currency - 
i.e. US dollars – which led to a reduction in service provision. To address this, enterprises that 
generate hard currency (e.g. the tourist taxis, tourist rental cars, and tourist cocotaxi elements of 
Panatrans and the Transmetro services that hire out buses and trucks to dollar-owning companies) 
cross subsidise the other services, in particular OM and MetroBus. 
In addition, a service planning team from the Regional Transit Authority of Paris (RATP) has 
been working to redefine the public transport network in the capital. The main aim of this project 
has been to rationalise the number of existing routes to match the actual passenger demand. The 
first of these new principal routes has already been put into place.  
ENOCH: EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSPORT PRACTICES IN CUBA 
 
 
4 
Roads 
Responsibility for the building of roads nationally resides with the Ministry of Construction. 
Maintenance falls to the regional MITRANS offices. Roads that carry public transport vehicles are 
given priority for repair over smaller roads. There are nearly 61,000km of roads in Cuba, of which 
28% are paved rural roads, 27% paved urban roads and 45% are unpaved rural roads. The most 
important road is the Central Highway which runs for 1,200km from Pinar del Río to Santiago.  
The state of the Cuban road system, like other parts of the national transport infrastructure, 
is dilapidated due to a continual lack of maintenance. Road surfaces have continued to deteriorate 
during the 1990’s due to lack of resurfacing with only major repairs to certain areas being 
undertaken. The government has had to take a stance of limiting road resurfacing to every 15 
years, rather than the intended ten years. Due to this lengthened period, the refurbishment costs 
rapidly increase as roads deteriorate far more quickly the longer they are neglected. Currently it is 
suggested that only 46 % of all the paved roads are in a ‘good’ condition due to the lack of road 
maintenance. 
Cars 
In Cuba, cars tend to be one of three types. There are privately-owned (generally US built 
cars bought before the 1959 revolution, plus some vehicles from Eastern Europe, the USSR and 
other countries), which were sold to some officials, university graduates, national vanguard workers 
and other public and private sector workers at a discount. Finally, there are Government/tourist 
cars (that are usually Asian/Western European-built cars from 1990 onwards).  
Many of these vehicles are also registered as taxis. As of 2002, the Police Department of 
Ministerio del Interior (MINIT) was conducting a major car census by introducing new registration 
plates. Plates for all vehicles in use will be updated allowing the first verified count of all vehicles 
within the country. The main problems facing vehicle owners are the lack of basic supplies 
including spare parts, fluids and tyres which can result in vehicles which might be considered not 
road-worthy. Furthermore, with a severe strain on parts, high levels of recycling parts or the use of 
makeshift piecework is a common solution. Currently, it is estimated that there are some 173,000 
cars, 29,000 buses, nearly 160,000 lorries and vans, 180,000 motorcycles and 11,400 tractors, 
equating to 32 vehicles per 1000 population, although it is difficult to verify this number2. This is 
because it is known that many cars are registered but no longer exist (having been cannibalised for 
spare parts for example), while other cars are being stored in barns or garages but are no longer 
registered nor being used. A similar trend for light duty trucks can been observed, especially in 
Havana, where many open-body trucks have been converted into makeshift collective buses and 
taxi vehicles. In the case of all vehicles, but especially collective taxis, there is a drive for high-
occupancy to ensure maximum efficiency (as will be shown later). Interestingly, motorisation as a 
function of income in Cuba broadly matches that found for many low income developing countries 
such as the Philippines and the Ivory Coast (Gakenheimer, 1999; IRF, 2000). This is despite the 
unique difficulties Cubans have in buying vehicles, vehicle parts and fuel. For a direct comparison, 
Figure 2 shows the current rate of motorisation (vehicles/1000 inhabitants) in various countries 
(IRF, 2000) including some of Cuba’s nearest island states, as well as some others which are 
frequently linked for comparison purposes. Although precise values for Cuba (shown as an X in 
Figure 2) are yet to be determined, estimates show that the numbers of vehicles in Cuba is similar 
to their geographic neighbours, as well as others in similar conditions. In general, one can group 
the countries shonw into 4 or 5 distinct clusters based on the GDP and motorisation level. Cuba is 
comparable with Haiti, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras and Ecuador. The second cluster (>$3000- 
5000 GDP) contains Guatemala, Paraguay, Jamaica, Peru and El Salvador. Columbia and the 
Dominican Republic are just above the $5000 GDP threshold along with Brazil, Panama and 
Venezuela. Countries from $8000-10000 are: Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile and Uruguay. The highest 
motorisation rates shown here (and GDPs) are observed in Puerto Rico, Argentina and Barbados. 
The figure is meant to be indicative of where Cuba lies in the GDP and motorisation ‘map’ and 
other work has shown that in many cases the correlation is much stronger when the highest 
percentiles of the GDP are linked to motorisation (Gakenheimer, 1999). 
                                                          
2 For comparison, the number of vehicles per 1000 people in 1997 was 110 in Chile, 45 in Ecuador, 
and 17 in Guatemala. In the USA the number was 767 (IRF, 2000). 
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FIGURE 2: The rate of motorisation (vehicles/1000 persons) as a function of GDP, for various developing countries. 
Rail 
The railways in Cuba are nationalised and run by the UFC (Union de Ferrocarriles de Cuba – 
Union for Railways of Cuba) for passenger and freight traffic, and for sugar-related haulage by 
MINAZ (Ministerio del Azucar – the Ministry for Sugar). In 2000, there was 11,151km of track, of 
which 38% was dedicated for public use; the remainder is used primarily for freight (mostly as 
sugar cane). With only slightly more than 200 locomotives, and approximately 700 passenger 
coaches, passenger rail patronage is severely constrained by lack of diesel powered locomotives. 
Currently annual passenger volume is some 12 million per annum, but demand is estimated at two-
and-a-half to three times this value, with the busiest route being between Havana and Santiago de 
Cuba, some 836km apart by rail. The rolling stock has an average age of about 30 years leading to 
reliability problems, and both passenger and freight rail traffic volumes are decreasing as a result.  
Planning 
Land use planning is tightly controlled, with 75% of the land owned by the Government and 
the remainder owned by co-operatives and small-scale farmers. All cities with populations over 
20,000 have a land use plan which illustrates exactly what type of development should be built 
where.  
Overall Characteristics 
Clearly Cuba is a developing country, but on the other hand its economic circumstances 
have been distorted by external economic effects for so long that it also exhibits a number of 
unique characteristics. Gakenheimer (1999) outlined a series of distinguishing features typically 
exhibited by developing countries, noted in Table 1. 
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Characteristics Comments on the Cuba situation 
1. Rapid pace of motorisation –  Certainly not true due to the economic 
blockade and Government policy. 
2. Travel demand far exceeds the supply of 
facilities, particularly road space  
True, although it is public transport rather than 
road capacity that is the critical variable. 
3. High share of trips by public transport True. Green modes too are well used. 
4. Intense desire for auto ownership and use There is a desire for auto ownership, but most 
people see this as a distant dream rather than 
a possible goal. 
5. Urban structure incompatible with 
motorisation  
Current land use patterns are incompatible 
with motorisation, while development is taking 
place according to a strict land use plan that 
aims to promote the use of green modes and 
public transport, while limiting car use. 
6. Stronger land use/transportation 
relationship due to faster rates of 
development  
Development is probably slower than in other 
Developing Countries due to the lack of 
available hard currency resources.  
7. Greater differences in vehicle 
performance  
Wide variety of vehicle types. Many developed 
as a direct response to the Blockade. 
8. Inadequate street and highway 
maintenance  
Clearly the case due to the lack of hard 
currency resources. 
9. Fewer legal constraints on the use of new 
technologies  
True. People encouraged to get around by 
any means they can. 
10. Weak driver discipline Possibly true, although traffic laws are rigidly 
enforced and there are many police. 
11. Very limited agreement on planning 
approaches  
Planning approaches would appear to be 
consistent. 
12. Capital is scarce and operating subsidies 
difficult to sustain   
A lack of hard currency is the major problem. 
13. Local transportation development is more 
centralised  
True, although provinces do have some say in 
how transport is organised. 
Table 1: Transport characteristics in developing countries: The case of Cuba (Adapted from Gakenheimer, 1999) 
From this, Cuba exhibits ‘typical’ developing country transport features in the majority of 
categories. Crucially however, the economic crisis has dramatically slowed the pace of 
motorisation while a strong political lead (again combined with the economic situation) has ensured 
that development has been tightly controlled. 
A transport crisis examined 
The impact of the post-Soviet State of Emergency on travel patterns in Cuba is difficult to 
measure due to the large number of different responses, many of them informal, made by 
Government and by individuals. However, if figures on the number of vehicles and the amount of oil 
used in the transport sector are examined - perhaps the most obvious proxies for mobility – the 
situation was calamitous. Cuban imports as a whole fell by 75%, from 8.1bn Cuban Pesos in 1989 
to 2.0bn Cuban Pesos in 1993, while over the same period in the transport sector, fuel (i.e. oil) 
imports were cut by 76%, and imports of transport equipment fell by 86% (Farah, 1992; Diaz-
Briquets and Perez-Lopez, 1995). One example of how this affected transport provision is 
illustrated by the bus sector. In Havana, by May 1993 the number of operational buses was only 
500 compared to 2,200 before the collapse of the socialist block, while outside the capital the 
number of bus routes operated at the end of 1992 had been cut by more than 80% compared with 
three years earlier.  
More generally, the effects are illustrated in Figure 3, which summarises the average annual 
kilometres travelled on public transport (rail, bus, state-owned vehicles, air and sea) per person. 
Overall this has declined significantly, having peaked at nearly 3000km/yr in 1986, and fell rapidly 
to a low of 744km by 1995. Although by 2000 it had stabilised around 850km, this remains at early 
1960’s levels. Note that this analysis is only based on motorised values and as such does not 
consider the importance of pedestrian, bicycle and private car journeys. This mobility index is 
broadly comparable with the poorer Latin American countries. El Salvador (718km) and Ecuador 
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(1245km), for example, exhibit similar motorised mobility levels to Cuba. These figures translate to 
a value in millions of passenger trips of 3.6 billion per annum at the peak in 1986 (or around 10m a 
trips a day for a population of 11.2m) dropping to 0.5m trips in 1995, but increasing again to 0.8m 
five years later.  
FIGURE 3: The trend in kilometres travelled per person per year for Cuban citizens for the period 1962 to present. 
For completeness, it should be noted that along with mobility, factors such as traffic noise, 
emissions, energy use, road deaths etc. should be considered. The low level of travel (even in 
1990) is reflected in the very low carbon dioxide emissions from transport per capita, with Cubans 
generating a mere 0.5 tonnes per annum compared with 20 tonnes per person in the USA, 11 in 
Germany, nine in Japan, five in Portugal, and two in China (Díaz, 1998). For road accidents, in 
Cuba in 1997 IRF (2000) reports that there were 8857 injuries and 1309 deaths on the road – a 
rate of 11.8 per 100,000 population. It is notable that low mobility has not cut road accident rates; 
Cuba’s are fairly typical for South America and compares with a rate of five deaths per 100,000 in 
Mexico (1994), 17 in Brazil (1995), and 32 in South Africa (1992). The corresponding figures in the 
UK was six (1997), and in the USA 16 (1995) (Vasconcellos, 2001; IRF, 2000).  
Transport Responses to the Economic Emergency 
Returning to the issue of mobility, while the total number of trips fell, many were substituted 
by a combination of more walking and cycling, increased vehicle occupancy and the development 
of new modes. This phenomenon is illustrated using data gathered in Havana in 1981 and 1998 
(see Table 2). 
 
Mode % in 1981 % in 1998 
Pedestrian 6 43.0 
Bicycle** < 1 13.5 
Enterprise bus - 10.8 
Other* 3.5 10.8 
Public bus 84.5 9.5 
Camello - 6.7 
Car 6 5.6 
Table 2: Percentage transport mode distribution in Havana in 1981 and 1998 (Alepuz and Valdés Ríos, 2002)  
                                                          
** Bicycle was not measured directly and is estimated to be approximately < 1%. 
* Includes ferries, suburban railway, cicliobus, tricycles, motorcycles and other modes. 
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Particularly noticeable is how the modal share of motorised transport fell from 93% to about 
43% over the period, making Havana one of the most non motorised cities in the world (57% modal 
share) just under Beijing, China (62%), Jaipur, India (66%), and Bobo Dioulasso, Burkina Faso 
(87%) (Vasconcellos, 2001). In addition, the share of cycling increased from 0.5% to 13%, despite 
the problems of increased accident rates, unreasonably long cycling distances and the need for 
bicycle infrastructure and support facilities.  
Demand side responses 
The economic downturn effectively cut demand for freight transport and the lack of transport 
supply has effectively forced many people to either make fewer trips, or else made them ‘trip chain’ 
more efficiently. Overall, transport demand was suppressed. 
Land use planning too has been used to control trip lengths, which is unusual in a 
developing country. Typically, cities deploy a strong green belt policy to prevent urban sprawl, and 
new developments are concentrated along public transport corridors. In addition, mixed-use 
developments are encouraged so that where new housing is constructed for example, enough new 
schools and shops are also provided to maximise walking opportunities. 
Data on how much travel was reduced through people moving house or job or by changing 
working patterns are difficult to find. However, it was realised that there were many not-too-
specialised workers who had jobs far from their homes. A system was therefore put in place to 
allow people to exchange their job for one closer to their home, which resulted in over 10,000 
people exchanging their jobs to reduce the time and resources spent on commuting (Huot, 1997). 
In the case of a person having to change their job location (in order to be closer to their residence) 
the government guaranteed an equal salary for the new job position, even if the work position 
should have been paid a lower rate. This state subsidy was felt by Government to cost less than 
the savings made on energy for transport and time under this scheme. In addition to this subsidy, 
the State of Emergency regulations allowed businesses and work centres to change their working 
patterns. In some cases where the business previously had been open six days a week, a more 
flexible pattern emerged, where only alternate Saturdays were staffed. Others reduced to a five day 
week with the same level of total hours worked. These changes had subtle effects on the demands 
for transport as the peak times were either condensed or smoothed out. The policy did not apply to 
rural areas, and no farm workers were transferred to work in urban areas. However, while moving 
jobs (and creating flexible working times) was made possible in Cuba, moving house is more 
complicated, involving a lot of bureaucracy and/or money. This has proven to be a key barrier, and 
as a result, the flexible working practices are not thought to have been a significant influence on the 
reduction in travel.  
Supply systems effects 
On the supply side, fuel and spare parts became increasingly scarce meaning that formal 
public transport services in particular became less frequent and less reliable. Policies were 
therefore adopted to increase the efficiency of the vehicles available. This was done in several 
ways. Firstly, new informal public transport modes such as truck transport and employer-operated 
work buses were developed. Secondly, the occupancy of existing vehicles was increased through 
measures such as organised and informal hitchhiking and the encouragement of ‘collectivo’ taxi 
sharing schemes. Thirdly, technological developments in alternative fuel types were made. 
Fourthly, regulatory and fiscal instruments designed to limit the demand for the small number of 
private cars were adopted. Finally, walking and cycling were encouraged, as was the adoption of 
animal-powered traction.  
New modes 
With the reduction in usable buses available to serve passengers, public transport agencies 
were forced to consider developing new modes. In Havana, flatbed truck trailers pulled by ex-army 
lorry cabs were given sides, seats, doors, windows, and roofs so they could carry 220 passengers 
at one time. In 2002, there were ~180 ‘camellos’ (called camels because of the ‘hump’ in the 
design) operating on seven core ‘colour-coded’ routes. The network operates as a surface metro 
system, with route distances of around 20-23km and an average distance between stops of 1.5 km, 
compared with around 400m for bus stops. Service frequencies range from four-minute to ten-
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minute intervals. The camello network currently carries around 250,000 passengers each day in 
Havana, compared with 374,000 by other public buses (Valdés Ríos, 2002). Outside of the capital 
too, truck transport is important although the only concession to passengers may often be a plank 
of wood to sit on and sometimes not even that.  
Prior to the State of Emergency, works buses had been used only where companies were 
not located on a bus route or where workers were required to work late evening or early morning 
shifts. But, the severe drop in service levels meant that by 2001 there were some 3,500 works 
buses carrying around 300,000 people a day. In general, these are older buses donated by or 
bought second hand from sympathetic public transport operators from across the world. These 
tend to cater only for commuter journeys and travel only 25km-50km a day, compared with 150km-
200km driven by a public bus each day. 
Coco-taxis carry up to three dollar paying passengers in a coconut shaped – hence the 
name – fibre glass shell that is bolted onto a motorcycle chassis, rather like Tuk-Tuks found in 
South East Asia.  
In order to extend the use of bicycles through the tunnel linking central Havana with Habana 
del Este, a so-called ‘cyclo-bus’ service was introduced in 1991. This was originally operated using 
trucks with a trailer attached, but in 1992 these were replaced with buses. Currently, six vehicles 
operate at a time, with four spares. Each vehicle can carry up to 22 bicycles, plus cyclists and other 
passengers. The fare is ten Cuban Peso cents per passenger or 20 Peso cents per bicycle or 
moped for the 4km journey. Around 4,200-4,300 passengers are carried daily, on 105 vehicle trips. 
Increasing vehicle occupancy 
Given the lack of available transport, hitchhiking is widespread throughout Cuba. This 
usually occurs on an informal basis, with people waiting at road junctions or by the side of the road 
thumbing for a lift. However, hitchhiking is also officially encouraged through legislation that 
requires certain Government vehicles to stop and give lifts when they have space available. In 
addition, at busy road junctions on the edge of some major towns, ‘amarillos’ (yellow men) are 
employed by provincial transport departments to facilitate hitchhiking. There are usually about three 
amarillos per junction, each dealing with around 1,000 passengers a day, and the system operates 
seven days a week from roughly 6am to 6pm. As well as matching passengers to vehicles, the 
amarillos take notes on the buses that pass. They do not deal with fares or tariffs, as these are 
strictly a matter between the rider and the driver. Car sharing is seen as particularly useful for 
people with packages, who would find it very difficult to board a bus or a camello. Overall, Cuban 
officials estimate that there were 31.5m hitchhiker trips made in 2000. 
The use of taxis is also maximised through the use of ‘collectivo’ shared private taxis. These 
perform as supplementary buses, by collecting passengers at established pick up points, and then 
dropping people off and picking people up along fixed routes. 
Technological developments 
One solution to the vehicle spare parts crisis was to take two Lada car bodies and convert 
them through a cutting and welding process into a single longer-bodied ‘stretched wheel base’ 
Lada ‘Limousine’ which could accommodate more people. This was a response to the lack of 
replacement engines for the vehicles – the motor represents the critical piece needed in Cuba.  
There is still widespread use of steam-powered locomotives (approximately 290) for the 
sugar cane haulage industry and for steam train tourism. Although steam engines do have an 
inherently lower efficiency when compared to diesel locomotives, they do give acceptable levels of 
speed and haulage. Various government industries in a cross-ministry effort have undertaken a 
research programme to re-evaluate the use of steam for both passenger and freight transport using 
a lighter type of locomotive. The engine boiler can be run on various fuel types including coal, 
wood, fuel oil and biomass. The use of bagasse (the final crushed cane fibre which remains after 
milling) is currently an important part of the animal feedstock for cattle, but this could easily be 
utilised as a biofuel. Running locomotives on sugar cane derived by-products is a distinct possibility 
which provides environmental benefits, is sustainable, and is locally sourced. This project is well 
under way with a single test locomotive already constructed and being tested. 
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Regulatory and fiscal instruments 
Petrol rationing was until 1992-93 the favoured instrument for allocating fuel to vehicle users. 
Typically, vehicle owners (or their employers) were given coupons entitling them up to 20 litres a 
month. With the adoption of the US Dollar as a legal currency, rationing was dropped and owners 
must buy their fuel instead at the market rate. Officially there is no tax on petrol, which is sold in US 
dollars. But, the state-owned Cuban oil company Union del Petroleo (CUPET) charges drivers 
around US$0.90 a litre, while buying crude oil at around US$0.22 (although this crude oil must then 
be processed and distributed across the country). Currently, around 10% of the one million tonnes 
of petrol and diesel used each year by particular enterprises in the transport sector (e.g. for the 
police, hospitals, agricultural workers, public transport companies, etc) is set aside – i.e. effectively 
subsidised by the Government.  
In terms of other fiscal mechanisms to limit car use, there are no purchase taxes on cars 
while the annual registration tax is nominal. In addition, there are currently two toll roads in the 
country, both in areas serving mainly tourist traffic. Drivers must pay a US$1 fee at the entrance to 
the freeway to Varadero and on the road to Cayo Coco. These tolls began in 1996 and were 
specifically chosen due to their importance as major tourist centres. Money raised from the fees 
goes directly to the Ministry of Transport who uses it to fund road maintenance programmes. 
Alternatives to motorised travel 
With the reduction in bus service levels caused by the lack of spare parts and the fuel 
shortage, the number of walking trips in Cuba rose significantly as did trip walk length. As of 2002, 
the average length of walk trip is estimated at 5km, while more than half of walk journeys take 
longer than 40 minutes. 
Prior to 1990, there were virtually no bicycles in Cuba, but with the State of Emergency a 
team of 25 planners was formed in March 1991 to design the various bicycle facilities that would be 
necessary for safe and efficient circulation of bicycle traffic. More than two million bicycles were 
bought from China and sold to Cubans for a fraction of the cost. Local factories were also 
established which produced some 150,000 bicycles a year during the mid-1990s. As of 1997, there 
were approximately two million bicycles in the country, half of which were in Havana (Huot, 1997). 
In addition, the bike road network (lanes, cycle routes and safety measures) was completed. 
Related to the increase in bicycle use, was the introduction of the cyclo-taxi - pedal-powered 
tricycles that can carry up to two passengers. In ten provinces in Cuba in 2000 (not including 
Havana, Matanzas, and Cienfuegos), they made 9.3m passenger trips. While the peak usage of 
bicycles was in 1994, by 1998 there were still 529,000 cycle trips per day in Havana. Bikes also 
accounted for 14.4% of commuting trips – i.e. more than were made by urban bus, camellos or 
works buses. The typical cycle distance was 4.4 km while the average travel time was 34 minutes3. 
To substitute the bicycles would require 128 buses, 57 more camellos or 300 more work buses 
(Valdés Ríos, 2002). However, cycle use has since declined due to a number of reasons, including 
a slight improvement in the bus service and a decline in the services to cyclists (repair shops, cycle 
parks etc.).  
The use of animal traction for freight transport, passenger transport and agriculture 
increased significantly from 1991 onwards. This has almost exclusively been provided by the 
private sector. From 1998, owners of animal traction vehicles have been required to register with 
provincial or municipal offices of the State Traffic Unit for a Licence for Transport Operation. By 
2000, there were more than 16,000 animal powered buses, carts, carriages and wagons. 
Interestingly though, the number of horses, mules and donkeys in 1998 was only 55% of the 
number in 1977 – 464,000 compared with 849,000 – and this could be a constraint on the further 
development of animal traction. In 2000, animal traction accounted for 93.2m passenger trips in the 
13 provinces outside of Havana. Further information is therefore required about how to more 
efficiently manage horses, mules and donkeys in urban and rural areas (Valdés Ríos, 2000). 
                                                          
3 Interestingly this average journey length is less than that of pedestrians, while the average speed 
of 9km/hr is sedate to say the least. This may have something to do with the poor quality of the 
bicycles and road surfaces. 
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Where next for Cuba? 
Future transport policy in Cuba will be significantly influenced by whether the US Blockade is 
lifted or not. Assuming the Blockade is not lifted in the near future, policy will continue to focus on 
increasing the service level provided by formal public transport (i.e. buses) through building more 
vehicles and through efficiency gains. Ultimately, this would also involve replacing the camellos 
with articulated-buses or electric trolleybuses (or even light rail systems in the longer term) within 
Havana, although this policy would be heavily dependent upon whether sufficient hard currency 
could be raised.  
If the Blockade were reduced or lifted, there would be a rise in economic and hence 
transport activity. It is difficult to estimate what this growth would be in a country free of constraints, 
but Cuban Government sources anticipate an immediate increase in the number of tourists from 
around 2m a year currently to 4m-7m. To deal with this potential influx, plans are already in place 
to allow the transport systems in place to grow significantly. In addition to the proposed 
replacement of the camellos with trams or high capacity buses in Havana, parking controls would 
be put into place in order to collect revenue along with appropriate land use policies. Meanwhile 
there would need to be investments in the maritime connections, including a programme to ensure 
that congestion around ferry ports (previously major entry points for American tourists) would not 
significantly increase. Cruise ships would also need to be catered for, while private car ownership 
would be reviewed after an initial period of unconstrained growth. One scenario would see the 
private vehicle owners being taxed heavily in order to discourage ownership and encourage the 
use of public transport systems and sustain non motorised means, e.g. bicycle usage. On top of 
this tourist influx, the increase in overall economic activity would certainly encourage increased 
mobility – much of it by motorised modes and maybe the private car in particular. 
In conclusion, the development of transport policy in Cuba has been heavily influenced by 
the condition of the national economy, which in turn has been dominated by the US Blockade and 
by the collapse of the USSR and the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe. This has led to a unique 
situation, whereby a fairly advanced country has been forced to curtail its natural economic 
development. This has had an effect at the national level as well as at the individual-personal 
choice level. 
At the national level, the planning policy mechanisms have reduced the need for travel, while 
the lack of transport supply has ensured that only ‘necessary’ trips are made. On top of this, the 
lack of fuel and spare parts has meant that those trips that are made are carried out either on 
vehicles operating at very high capacity or by using less or non-polluting modes. At an individual 
level, citizens are extremely aware as to the cost of transport and as such tend to conduct those 
journeys that are necessary, and then by the most efficient means. As a consequence, in terms of 
energy use at least Cuba now has a relatively environmentally benign transport system, although 
the localised pollution can be very bad due to the poor fuel quality and antiquated vehicle fleet.  
Overall, in reacting to an unprecedented set of circumstances the Cuban Government and 
people have devised a whole range of sophisticated and innovative responses in order to maintain 
necessary mobility. The current position, is not likely to last for long, and as the Cuban economy 
grows the issue of suppressed demand will become increasingly problematic. While planners and 
policy makers in Cuba are clearly committed to keeping the car in check, the evidence from many 
other less developed nations suggests that even socialist countries such as China and Vietnam are 
now accepting their populations desires to own and use cars. Indeed car ownership in China is 
increasing at a rate of 15% per year, and Government surveys that show how Chinese families are 
prepared to spend two year’s income for a car that is expected to last ten years (Gakenheimer, 
1999). However, with very careful preparation it may just be possible for Cuba to avoid many of the 
pitfalls of mass car ownership already experienced by other countries that had been unhindered by 
external and political forces. Higher transport use is inevitable, but America’s blockade may have 
nudged Cuba towards a more sustainable and less transport intensive society than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
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